Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof by H. Reiju Mihara
Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social
Choice Function: A Constructive Proof∗
H. Reiju Mihara†
reiju@ec.kagawa-u.ac.jp
Economics, Kagawa University, Takamatsu, 760-8523, Japan
February, 2000
[Social Choice and Welfare (2001) 18: 543–553]
Abstract
This paper gives a concrete example of a nondictatorial, coalition-
ally strategyproof social choice function for countably inﬁnite societies.
The function is deﬁned for those proﬁles such that for each alternative,
the coalition that prefers it the most is “describable.” The “describ-
able” coalitions are assumed to form a countable Boolean algebra. The
paper discusses oligarchical characteristics of the function, employing
a speciﬁc interpretation of an inﬁnite society. The discussion clariﬁes
within a single framework a connection between the negative result
(the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem) for ﬁnite societies and the posi-
tive result for inﬁnite ones.
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11 Introduction
A social choice function assigns an alternative to each proﬁle of individ-
ual preferences. If the function is not coalitionally strategyproof, then at
some proﬁle p, a coalition of individuals are better oﬀ misrepresenting their
preferences (that is, a deviation from p is proﬁtable for the coalition). I
give a concrete example of a nondictatorial, coalitionally strategyproof so-
cial choice function for countably inﬁnite societies. The existence of such a
function has been shown by Pazner and Wesley [16] in a non-constructive
manner for the unrestricted domain of proﬁles.
The existence of (individually or coalitionally) strategyproof social choice
functions has been studied both in the case of a ﬁnite set of individuals
(voters) and in the case of an inﬁnite set of individuals.
When there are only ﬁnitely many individuals, there exists no nondicta-
torial, individually strategyproof social choice function on the unrestricted
domain of proﬁles (of individual preferences satisfying the usual ordering
properties). The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [5, 18] states that.
In contrast, when there are inﬁnitely many individuals, there exists a
nondictatorial, individually strategyproof social choice function on the un-
restricted domain of proﬁles. Pazner and Wesley [16, p. 254] show the exis-
tence by giving a concrete example.
In the case of an inﬁnite society, considering coalitional strategyproof-
ness, not just individual strategyproofness is particularly important, in view
of interpretation. (I will comment on this point in Section 4.1.) Pazner and
Wesley indeed consider coalitional strategyproofness. They prove [16, Theo-
rem] that when there are inﬁnitely many individuals, there exists a nondicta-
torial, coalitionally strategyproof social choice function on the unrestricted
domain. The proof, however, relies on a non-constructive mathematical
technique,1 failing to present any concrete example of a function satisfying
the conditions.
In their subsequent work, Pazner and Wesley [17] turn to the problem
of explicitly constructing a social choice function that is nondictatorial and
coalitionally strategyproof. Their approach is to modify the notion of strat-
egyproofness. They start by deﬁning a nondictatorial social choice function
explicitly. Next, they ﬁx an arbitrary countable collection of coalitions. In-
tuitively, the coalitions in the collection are the “describable” ones. Then,
1The proof relies on the axiom SPI, “each inﬁnite set carries a free ultraﬁlter”—an
axiom that cannot be derived from the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory without the
axiom of choice. Brunner and Mihara [3] give a further discussion.
2they conclude by showing [17, Theorem 2] that for almost every proﬁle the
function is strategyproof for all coalitions in the collection: no coalition in
the collection can deviate from the proﬁle proﬁtably. A drawback of the
function is that it violates neutrality (equal treatment of alternatives). In
fact, it chooses the same alternative for almost all proﬁles.
I take a diﬀerent approach in this paper. Instead of considering social
choice functions on the unrestricted domain of proﬁles, I restrict (Section 2)
proﬁles in a natural way. I admit only those proﬁles such that for each
alternative the set (coalition) of individuals that prefer it the most, is “de-
scribable” (or “observable”)—and I assume that there are only countably
many “describable” coalitions. I then (Section 3) construct a nondictatorial
social choice function on the restricted domain of those admissible proﬁles
and show the main result (Theorem 2) that it is coalitionally strategyproof
in the usual sense (i.e., strategyproof for all admissible proﬁles and for all
coalitions). Though the function satisﬁes the neutrality condition, it has
certain oligarchical characteristics. I observe (Section 4.1) this fact, employ-
ing a speciﬁc interpretation of an inﬁnite society. The observation clariﬁes
a connection between the negative result (the Gibbard-Satterthwaite the-
orem) for ﬁnite societies and the positive result for inﬁnite ones. I then
conclude the paper with a discussion (Section 4.2) that the function may
be regarded as a component of a more appealing superrule, suggesting a
problem for further investigation.
2 Framework
Let N = {1,2,3,...} be a countably inﬁnite set of individuals (voters). Let
X be a ﬁnite set of alternatives, which has at least three elements. Let S be
the set of (strict) preferences, i.e., total, asymmetric, and transitive binary
relations on X. (For simplicity, indiﬀerence is not allowed.)
A Boolean algebra B consisting of subsets of N satisﬁes the following:
(i) ∅, N ∈ B; (ii) A ∪ B, A ∩ B, Ac ∈ B if A, B ∈ B (where Ac denotes
the complement of A). Intuitively, an element of a Boolean algebra is a
coalition describable (or observable) to the planner (an imaginary person
that executes a social choice function). The main theorem assumes a count-
able Boolean algebra that contains all ﬁnite coalitions. The countability
condition corresponds to the real-world observation that a language has to
be used to describe anything, but there are only countably many sentences
in a written language (provided that the alphabet of the language consists
of ﬁnitely many letters). The condition that the Boolean algebra contains
3all ﬁnite coalitions is equivalent to the condition that it contains all one-
individual coalitions. The intuition is that each individual is describable. (I
assume a countable set of individuals for this reason.) Each of the following
four examples of a Boolean algebra is (i) countable and (ii) contains all ﬁnite
coalitions.
Example 1. The collection of all ﬁnite sets and all coﬁnite sets (the com-
plements of a ﬁnite set) in N is the minimal Boolean algebra that satisﬁes
the two conditions above. Empirical scientists that take an extreme position
might reject observability of any inﬁnite object. This is the only Boolean
algebra that is acceptable to them.
Example 2. Let REC consist of all recursive sets in N. (According
to Church’s thesis these are the sets whose membership is algorithmically
decidable [20, 4].) Then REC is a Boolean algebra. The notion of recur-
sive coalitions (which I used [12, 13] in social choice theory) is a stringent
formalization [4, pp. 225 and 197] of the intuitive notion of “describable”
coalitions.
Example 3. An arithmetical set in N is a set deﬁnable in the intended
structure for the language of number theory (as described in Enderton [4],
especially pp. 235–7, 174–5, and 88). The class of arithmetical sets is a
Boolean algebra containing all recursive sets. The notion of arithmetical
coalitions is a less stringent formalization of the intuitive notion of “describ-
able” coalitions than Example 2.
Example 4. A rational interval on [0,1] is a set of rational numbers
that can be expressed in one of the following forms: {x : a < x < b},
{x : a < x ≤ b}, {x : a ≤ x < b}, {x : a ≤ x ≤ b}, where a and b
are some rational numbers such that 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1. The collection of all
ﬁnite unions of rational intervals on [0,1] is a Boolean algebra. Since there
is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of rational numbers and the
set N, each element of this Boolean algebra can be regarded as a subset
of N. This Boolean algebra (as well as its higher-dimensional extensions)
has an obvious interpretation in areas (such as political theory and regional
science) where Hotelling locational (spatial) models are used.
The next example is diﬀerent from the four examples just mentioned. It
is a ﬁnite Boolean algebra, which does not contain all ﬁnite coalitions. The
example enables one to treat (as in Section 4.1) the case of ﬁnitely many
people within the present framework.
4Example 5. Consider a ﬁnite partition of N. (It does not have to be
that all the partition elements are inﬁnite.) The collection of all unions of
elements in the partition is a Boolean algebra. In fact, any ﬁnite Boolean
algebra is of this form, where the partition consists of its atoms (nonempty
sets containing no proper nonempty subset that belongs to the Boolean
algebra).
Let B be a Boolean algebra. A proﬁle is a list p = (Â
p
i )i∈N ∈ SN of
individual preferences Â
p
i , where i ∈ N. A proﬁle (Â
p
i )i∈N is B-admissible
if
{i ∈ N : x Â
p
i y for all alternatives y 6= x} ∈ B
for all x ∈ X. Denote by SN(B) the set of all B-admissible proﬁles. A
(B)-social choice function is a function F from SN(B) onto X which maps
each proﬁle p = (Â
p
i )i∈N into an alternative. I assume that F is onto (i.e.,
the image is X) to avoid trivial cases.
Remark 1. The reader may object to the admissibility condition on
the grounds that it implies correlation between the preferences of diﬀerent
individuals. To defend the condition, I give two interpretations. The ﬁrst is
the uncertainty interpretation in Section 4.1, where there are only ﬁnitely
many people, who face inﬁnitely many states. In this case, the admissibility
condition simply reﬂects the reasonable epistemological requirement that
each person can describe for each alternative, the set of states in which
he prefers it the most. The second interpretation is a society made up of
inﬁnitely many people extending into the indeﬁnite future. In this case, it
is natural to suppose that we are dealing with preferences reported by a
ﬁnite number of living voters (who “represent” some future generations),
rather than the actual preferences. The admissibility condition reﬂects the
reasonable requirement that what is reported should be describable. k
Remark 2. In related papers [11, 12, 13, 14], I used the domain of
measurable proﬁles, as in Armstrong [1, 2]. (I say that a proﬁle (Â
p
i )i∈N is
B-measurable (p ∈ SN
B ) if {i ∈ N : x Â
p
i y } ∈ B for all x, y ∈ X. Note that
when X is ﬁnite, all B-measurable proﬁles are B-admissible: SN
B ⊂ SN(B).)
I argue below (Remark 5) that the main result (Theorem 2) holds for either
domain. k
Suppose that a Boolean algebra B contains all coalitions consisting of
only one individual (thus B contains all ﬁnite coalitions). A (B)-social
choice function F is dictatorial if there exists an individual i such that
5for all B-admissible proﬁles p = (Â
p
i )i∈N, we have F(p) Â
p
i y for all alter-
natives y 6= F(p). A (B)-social choice function F is said to be coalitionally
manipulable if for some B-admissible proﬁles p = (Â
p
i )i∈N, p0 = (Â
p0
i )i∈N





i / ∈ E and F(p0) Â
p
i F(p) for all i ∈ E. (Note that E need not be a member
of B.) If in the deﬁnition of coalitional manipulability, “nonempty coalition”
is replaced by “one-individual coalition,” we have individual manipulability.
F is coalitionally (individually) strategyproof if it is not coalitionally (indi-
vidually) manipulable.
3 Construction of the social choice function
Since the purpose of this paper is to exhibit a nondictatorial, coalitionally
strategyproof (B)-social choice function in an explicit fashion, I start by
deﬁning a candidate G for such a function. I assume that B is a countable
Boolean algebra that contains all ﬁnite coalitions.
To deﬁne the function G, I now construct a collection U of coalitions
in the Boolean algebra B. Each coalition in the collection is understood to
be a “majority” or “plurality” of the individuals. First, ﬁx an enumeration





Us ∪ {Cs} if this family has an inﬁnite intersection,
Us otherwise.
The condition for the ﬁrst case in the deﬁnition of Us+1 means that (
T
Us)∩




C∈Us C. Finally, let U =
S∞
s=0 Us. Note that
U does not contain any ﬁnite coalitions. (In the trivial case of Example 1,
U consists of all coﬁnite coalitions. What is signiﬁcant about the above
construction is that it deﬁnes a collection U for nontrivial cases too.)
Having constructed the collection U of “majorities,” I can deﬁne the
social choice function G from SN(B) to X by
G(p) = x ⇐⇒ {i ∈ N : x Â
p
i y for all alternatives y 6= x} ∈ U (1)
for each proﬁle p = (Â
p
i )i∈N. (I show below that G is well-deﬁned.) Intu-
itively, G chooses an alternative x when the individuals that prefer x the
most, form a “majority.” U is called the set of decisive coalitions for G. It
6is obvious that G is nondictatorial since U does not contain any coalitions
consisting of a single individual.
The next proposition (which is proved in Appendix A) is the key to the
main theorem. To state the proposition, I now introduce the notion of an
“ultraﬁlter” (Koppelberg [9, p. 32] gives an exposition). A ﬁlter F on a
Boolean algebra B is a family of sets in B satisfying: (i) ∅ / ∈ F; (ii) if A ∈ F
and A ⊆ B, then B ∈ F; (iii) if A, B ∈ F, then A ∩ B ∈ F. Intuitively, a
ﬁlter is a family of “large” sets. An ultraﬁlter is a ﬁlter F that satisﬁes: if
A / ∈ F, then Ac ∈ F. Suppose B contains all ﬁnite sets in N. Then we say
that an ultraﬁlter F is ﬁxed if it is of the form F = {A ∈ B : i ∈ A} for
some i ∈ N; otherwise, it is called free and does not contain any ﬁnite sets.
Proposition 1 The set U of decisive coalitions is a free ultraﬁlter.
Remark 3. To see the simplicity of the function G informally, imagine
that the planner thinks of coalitions C0, C1, C2, ...one by one, and for
each Cs, she determines whether it is decisive. To determine whether Cs is
decisive or not, the planner does not have to know much. First, she only
needs her “past” decisions about C0, C1, ..., Cs−1. (In fact, she determines
Cs to be decisive as long as doing so does not result in the collection U failing
to be a free ultraﬁlter: If Cs is put into the collection Us+1 when Us ∪ {Cs}
does not have an inﬁnite intersection, then resulting U has a ﬁnite element,
namely the intersection of all the decisive coalitions up to Cs. But free ultra-
ﬁlters cannot have ﬁnite elements.) Second, she only needs the “aggregate
data”
T
Us, the intersection of all coalitions that she has determined to be
decisive up to that point. This simpliﬁes information processing consider-
ably. More formal analysis can be given (as in Mihara [13]) in a framework of
computability analysis of social choice, which studies algorithmic properties
of social choice rules. k
The following is the main theorem. It is concerned with the particular G
described above. It thereby establishes not only that a social choice function
satisfying the properties mentioned exists, but also that such a function can
be constructed explicitly.
Theorem 2 Let B be a countable Boolean algebra that contains all ﬁnite
coalitions. Suppose that C0, C1, C2, ...is an enumeration of all elements
of B. Then the nondictatorial (B)-social choice function G:SN(B) → X
described above is coalitionally strategyproof.
7With the help of Proposition 1, the proof of Theorem 2 goes as in the
proof of the Theorem in Pazner and Wesley [16, p.255]. Note that (1) well-
deﬁnes G since exactly one of the partition elements
{i ∈ N : x Â
p
i y for all alternatives y 6= x},
where x ranges over the ﬁnite X, belongs to the ultraﬁlter U (by a well-
known property [9, p. 32] of an ultraﬁlter).
Remark 4. The proof in Pazner and Wesley carries through for arbitrary
deviating coalitions E provided that U is deﬁned on a Boolean algebra and
proﬁles are admissible. k
Remark 5. To show that the main result is unaﬀected when the do-
main SN(B) of admissible proﬁles is replaced by the domain SN
B of measur-
able proﬁles, I now construct a social choice function g on the latter domain.
Deﬁne g from SN
B to X by
g(p) = x ⇐⇒ {i ∈ N : x Â
p
i y for all alternatives y 6= x} ∈ U
for each proﬁle p = (Â
p
i )i∈N in SN
B . (The function g is the restriction of
G to SN
B .) By the same argument as that in the proof, one can see that
g is well-deﬁned, nondictatorial, and coalitionally strategyproof. (That g is
coalitionally strategyproof can be proved directly from the fact that G is
coalitionally strategyproof.)
Conversely, I can ﬁrst construct a nondictatorial, coalitionally strate-
gyproof social choice function on the domain of measurable proﬁles and then
extend [14, Corollary 3] it to a nondictatorial, coalitionally strategyproof so-
cial choice function on the domain of admissible proﬁles. k
4 Discussion
The social choice function G constructed in Section 3 has the characteristics
of an oligarchy, as Pazner and Wesley [16] point out. This means that an
inﬁnite but arbitrarily “small” coalition of individuals can decide the social
outcome, regardless of the preferences of those outside it. (Kirman and
Sondermann [8], Armstrong [1], Sen [19], and Lauwers and Van Liedekerke
[10] make a similar observation in the context of Arrow’s Theorem for inﬁnite
societies.) Section 4.1 discusses this particular lack of anonymity under a
speciﬁc interpretation of an inﬁnite society. The discussion will clarify a
connection between the negative result for ﬁnite societies and the positive
result for inﬁnite ones. Section 4.2 concludes the paper by suggesting that
we view the function as a subrule of some game form.
84.1 Connection with the result for ﬁnite societies
According to my interpretation [12], an inﬁnite society of individuals con-
sists of ﬁnitely many persons, whose preferences are conditioned on inﬁnitely
many states (expressing uncertainty). If a person j prefers an alternative
(action) x to an alternative (action) y in a state s, I say that the individ-
ual (j,s) prefers x to y. (The same person at two diﬀerent states are thus
viewed as two diﬀerent individuals.) In this way, I can obtain inﬁnitely
many individuals, who are persons at diﬀerent states. At the time the social
choice is made, the real state is not known to the persons.
Remark 6. It might appear as natural to model the situation as one with
ﬁnitely many people having preferences over an inﬁnite set of (state-speciﬁc)
alternatives. In such a model, if a person j prefers an action x to another
action y in a state s, then the person j is said to prefer a (state-speciﬁc)
alternative (x,s) to another (y,s). In this case, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem for ﬁnite societies implies the nonexistence of nondictatorial, coali-
tionally strategyproof social choice function. The diﬀerence of the result
is due to the fact that in this model, each person (and the society) is re-
quired to compare every pair (x,s), (y,t) in the set of alternatives. Where
a state is chosen by Nature (chance) rather than by the society, this sort of
inter-state comparisons are often meaningless for the decision-making. My
interpretation above avoids inter-state comparisons. k
Note that this interpretation suggests the importance of considering
coalitional strategyproofness, not just individual strategyproofness, in the
case of an inﬁnite society. Under the interpretation, a particular person ¯ j
can misrepresent the preferences of many individuals (¯ j,s), for various s.
She can thus form proﬁtably deviating coalitions by herself, without com-
municating with other persons.
Now, to see the oligarchical characteristics of the function G under the
interpretation above, consider the proﬁles where each person has the same
preference at all states. (Diﬀerent persons may have diﬀerent preferences,
but all the preferences that belong to a given person is the same across dif-
ferent states. Note that these are the measurable proﬁles with respect to the
Boolean algebra in Example 5, where each partition element corresponds to
a person.) This may happen when persons are unable to distinguish any
state from other states because their knowledge is severely limited. If G is
restricted to these proﬁles, it can be re-interpreted as a social choice func-
tion for a ﬁnite set of persons. It turns out (by a property [9, p. 32] of an
ultraﬁlter) in this case that only one person’s preferences count: the social
9outcome will always be the most preferred alternative of that (dictatorial)
person. In other words, an “oligarchy” consisting of just one person exists.
The restricted function is coalitionally strategyproof (the dictator obviously
has no gain misrepresenting the preference; the others have no gain misrep-
resenting their preferences since doing so simply does not count), but only
in the trivial sense. A dictatorial person exists, since the number of persons
is ﬁnite. Since the number can be arbitrarily large, this means that an ar-
bitrarily small “coalition” (i.e., a person in an arbitrary large society) can
dictate the outcome.
A similar argument applies even if each person’s preference is more re-
sponsive to states. Suppose for example that each person has a ﬁnite par-
tition of the set of states such that for each partition element, she has the
same preference at all states belonging to the element. Suppose further that
this is because she can only distinguish between states belonging to diﬀer-
ent partition elements. (In the language of the formal model of knowledge
(see Osborne and Rubinstein [15, Section 5.1]), the information function
of a person is partitional here, and the partition consists of ﬁnitely many
events.) In this case, (by a property [9, p. 32] of an ultraﬁlter) there are
a person and a collection (one of her partition elements) of states that she
cannot distinguish between, that dictate the social outcome. This implies
(assuming a partitional information function) that in order to avoid this sort
of dictatorial person-collection pair, at least one person must have an inﬁnite
cognitive power (in the sense that she must be able to distinguish between
inﬁnitely many states; formally, her partitional information function must
be inﬁnitely valued).
4.2 The oligarchical function as a subrule
The discussion in Section 4.1 suggests that the function G itself is not very
appealing as a rule for democratic decision making. (The discussion applies
to any nondictatorial, coalitionally strategyproof social choice functions, not
just to G. So, G is not exceptional.) This, however, does not mean that the
function is not interesting. Consider, for example, a dictatorial social choice
function for a ﬁnite society. The dictatorial function itself is not very ap-
pealing. But when dictatorial functions are used to form a superrule, that
superrule may satisfy certain nice properties. Indeed, Hylland [7] shows
that the random dictators (where dictatorial functions are combined, given
ﬁxed weights) are the only strategyproof rules satisfying a certain condition.
There, a dictatorial function can be regarded as a subrule (component of
the superrule), which Nature (chance) chooses. Also, Hurwicz and Schmei-
10dler [6] show that a game form in which an individual (“kingmaker”) in eﬀect
selects a dictatorial function satisﬁes certain nice properties. A dictatorial
function is a subrule there, which the kingmaker chooses when playing the
game form.
In a similar fashion, the “oligarchical” function G may be regarded as a
subrule of a superrule having nice properties. A plausible candidate for such
a superrule is a game form Γ consisting of two groups (Group 1 and Group 2)
of individuals, where the individuals in Group 1 ﬁrst choose a social choice
function (such as G) for the society consisting of the individuals in Group 2.
To investigate the properties of such game forms formally is beyond
the scope of the present paper. To do that, one has to specify the game
form Γ, preferably in extensive form. Also, one has to be careful in choosing
a suitable concept of equilibrium: While the individuals in Group 2 may
reasonably be expected to have dominant strategies, those in Group 1 cannot
be expected to have dominant strategies (they are not likely to play best
responses either).
A Proof of Proposition 1
This appendix gives a proof of Proposition 1.
First, the following two lemmas are easily obtained by mathematical
induction.
Lemma 1 For all s and s0, (i) Us is a ﬁnite family consisting of inﬁnite
coalitions in B, and (ii) if s ≤ s0, then Us ⊆ Us0.
Lemma 2 For all s and s0, (i)
T




Lemma 3 For all s, if Cs ∈ U, then (
T
Us) ∩ Cs is inﬁnite and Cs ∈ Us+1.
Proof. Suppose Cs ∈ U. If (
T
Us) ∩ Cs is inﬁnite, then by the deﬁnition
of Us+1, Cs ∈ Us+1, and we are done.
So, suppose (
T
Us) ∩ Cs is ﬁnite. Since Cs ∈ U, it must be that Cs ∈ Ut
for some t. Without loss of generality, assume t > s. (If t ≤ s, then Cs ∈ Us.
So, (
T
Us) ∩ Cs =
T
Us, which is inﬁnite by Lemma 2. This contradicts the
assumption that (
T




Us by Lemma 2. Then
(
\
Ut) ∩ Cs ⊆ (
\
Us) ∩ Cs.
11But the expression on the right is ﬁnite, by assumption. Hence (
T
Ut) ∩ Cs




Ut) ∩ Cs, which is ﬁnite. This
contradicts Lemma 2.
Lemma 4 U is a ﬁlter.
Proof. (i) Since only inﬁnite coalitions belong to U by Lemma 1, ∅ / ∈ U.
(ii) Suppose Cs0 ∈ U and Cs ⊇ Cs0. We show that Cs ∈ U.
(Case: s0 < s). Since s0 + 1 ≤ s and Cs0 ∈ Us0+1, we have Cs0 ∈ Us.
Hence (
T
Us) ∩ Cs0 is inﬁnite, being equal to
T




Us) ∩ Cs0 ⊆ (
\
Us) ∩ Cs.
It follows that the right hand side expression is inﬁnite. So, Cs ∈ Us+1 ⊆ U.
(Case: s0 ≥ s). We have Us0 ⊇ Us and Cs ⊇ Cs0. To show Cs ∈ U,
suppose Cs / ∈ U. Then (
T









Us0)∩Cs is ﬁnite. But Cs0 ⊆ Cs implies that (
T
Us0)∩Cs0 is ﬁnite, being
a subset of (
T
Us0)∩Cs. Hence Cs0 / ∈ Us0+1. By Lemma 3, Cs0 / ∈ U, which is
a contradiction.
(iii) Suppose that Cs, Cs0 ∈ U. We show that Cs∩Cs0 ∈ U. Without loss
of generality, we may assume that s ≥ s0. Then Cs, Cs0 ∈ Us+1 by Lemma 3
and Lemma 1. Choose t such that Ct = Cs ∩ Cs0.
(Case: t > s). In this case, Cs, Cs0 ∈ Ut. Since
T
Ut is inﬁnite and
Ct = Cs ∩ Cs0 ⊃
T
Ut, it follows that (
T
Ut) ∩ Ct =
T
Ut is inﬁnite. So,
Ct ∈ Ut+1 ⊆ U.




Us+1. It follows that
(
\
Ut) ∩ Ct ⊇ (
\
Us+1) ∩ (Cs ∩ Cs0).
Since the set on the right is equal to Us+1, which is inﬁnite, the set on the
left is also inﬁnite. Therefore, Ct ∈ Ut+1 ⊆ U.
Lemma 5 U is an ultraﬁlter.
Proof. Suppose that Cs, Ct ∈ B, Cc
s = Ct, where s < t without loss of





Ut)∩Ct are ﬁnite. (Otherwise, Cs ∈ Us+1 or




Ut, it follows that
(
\
Us) ∩ Cs ⊇ (
\
Ut) ∩ Cs.







Ut) ∩ (Cs ∪ Ct)
= [(
\





Ut, being the union of ﬁnite sets, is ﬁnite. This contradicts Lemma 2.
We conclude that U is a free ultraﬁlter. This is immediate from Lemma 1
since any element of U has to be inﬁnite.
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